how is the physicotheological proof conducive to belief in god when we know that the only reason there's regularity in the world is that the cate...

how is the physicotheological proof conducive to belief in god when we know that the only reason there's regularity in the world is that the categories are preconditions of experience? He doesn't grant that it proves the existence of god, but he does seem to grant that it gives you reason to believe in at least whatever next-highest entity in the chain from conditioned to unconditioned that would explain the regularity in the universe. Yet the only reason there is regularity in the universe is because of the understanding, so I don't get why he grants even that.

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  1. 5 months ago
    Anonymous

    Yeah, I remember reading in the Prolegomena, if I recall correctly, that Kant kind of thought the argument from design to be acceptable, because the external world seemed to be intelligently made, but then what you are thinking necessarily follows. He should have said something about the regularity of our intersubjective forms for projecting regularity into the external world the one thing intelligently created instead.

  2. 5 months ago
    Anonymous

    you realize he was refuting the physico-theological argument, right? not endorsing it?

    • 5 months ago
      Anonymous

      His only problem with it is that because it is empirical it can’t take you all the way to God, but only to a more conditioned conception. I don’t understand why he cedes even that ground when the whole concept of regularity in nature is transcendentally ideal and not real.

      • 5 months ago
        Anonymous

        he says that if it were proven true somehow, it could at most prove an architect of the universe that exists within it rather than a supernatural being that exists outside of it
        he says nothing about if the argument itself holds up, just what the furthest conclusion you could get out of it is

        • 5 months ago
          Anonymous

          So do you think he didn’t bring up that causality is a category of the understanding because his concept of regularity of nature was different from causality or because he didn’t need to?

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            they're different

  3. 5 months ago
    Anonymous

    It's not convincing at all to reject the entire argument on that ground

  4. 5 months ago
    Anonymous

    I think for Kant there still exist natural laws outside of us... not everything is only orderly by the categories... the categories are the most basic foundation of laws but not everything... for example the beauty in nature is something else than just transcendental categories...

    • 5 months ago
      Anonymous

      I got the feeling while reading the critique that Kant probably thought that if you created all the basic empirical concepts in a complete elaboration of sort of pseudo-categories like Force then Newtonian physics would follow almost a priori. The fact that even substance is transcendental raises the question of how much can really be proved transcendentally. If you think about his proof of causality it basically assumes that the thing in itself had absolutely no say in the order in which events succeed. It makes time even more transcendentally ideal than you think. I think you could probably do a reductio ad absurdum of Kant if you managed to use the “its objective because its a precondition of experience” argument to prove whatever you wanted. The argument for causality is almost a reductio ad absurdum of it already. The whole argument basically makes it meaningless to say that something is objective because objectivity is just relative to subjectivity. All objectivity means is you can do a transcendental deduction of it. To say there’s anything outside us at that point and even to say that empirical events aren’t caused by us just doesn’t even work.

      • 5 months ago
        Anonymous

        >To say there’s anything outside us at that point and even to say that empirical events aren’t caused by us just doesn’t even work.

        Do you think the thing in itself is outside of us ?

        • 5 months ago
          Anonymous

          not him but thing in itself = what/how a thing is without any subjective (intersubjective) filter of perception

        • 5 months ago
          Anonymous

          Nothing we experience in the universe can be regarded as having been caused in any respect by the thing in itself

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            >Nothing we experience in the universe can be regarded as having been caused in any respect by the thing in itself

            You mean there can not be any natural laws besides the transcendental laws ?

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            No because empirical events aren’t caused by the thing in itself either. The whole point of proving the validity of causality is that the causes lie within representation.

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            >No because empirical events aren’t caused by the thing in itself either

            I think that I remember that Kant is talking about natural laws that are not transcendental laws in his critique of judgement... and there he also talks about the natural beauty as being a proof of god...

            but according to you natural laws besides the transcendental ones would not make sense and I can grasp that...

            but about the beauty of nature... is that something we constituted transcendentally, too ? I dont think so... but it can not be the thing in itself shining through because we can not know anything about the thing in itself...

            I think in the end the whole transcendental idealism is basically wrong... just false

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            >Nothing we experience in the universe can be regarded as having been caused in any respect by the thing in itself

            And still there is no phenomenon without a noumenon

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            all he says is that our intuitions aren’t the thing itself, I think that whether the thing itself “exists” or not or “causes” our intuitions is not relevant to the Kantian system.

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            Also, I don’t think noumena is a thing in itself. A noumenon is an intuition that lies solely in the understanding, i.e. a noumenon is something that was created by a divine mind. A noumenon would be a thing in itself because we don’t have intellectual intuitions, but I don’t think all things in themselves would necessarily be noumena.

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            > I don’t think noumena is a thing in itself
            The*

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            Noumenon intuition understanding? These words together make absolutely no sense in Kant. I don’t know why people try to grasp something that has no relation to what Kant himself said, in pretty straightforward terms. All we experience is phenomena, noumena would lie beyond them, but we cannot know even if they exist.

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            Read the section on the distinction beyween noumena and phenomena. He explicitly says that the noumenon would be an object given to the pure understanding through a non sensible intuition.

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            >Also, I don’t think noumena is a thing in itself.

            jea you are right about that my fault

          • 5 months ago
            Anonymous

            The weird thing is I’ve never heard anyone make the distinction between noumena specifically and things in themselves in general. Even schopenhauer says Kant contradicts himself when he talks about an “object in itself” and that he uses the term noumena incorrectly even though both terms make sense in context

  5. 5 months ago
    Anonymous

    tl;dr

  6. 5 months ago
    Anonymous

    >noumena phenomena distinction
    Absolutely destroyed by Hegel.

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